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AMERICAN MERCENARIES
- A HISTORICAL PRECEDENCE IN EAST ASIA -

BY

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COLONEL ALLAN D. MARPLE
United States Army

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
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AMERICAN MERCENARIES: A HISTORICAL PRECEDENCE IN EAST ASIA

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Colonel Allan D. Marple
United States Army

Dr. Joseph T. Glatthaar, Ph.D.
Project Adviser

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17103

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ABSTRACT

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This study examines 2 programs during which the US Army employed mercenaries in East Asia: the Philippine Scouts during the Philippine Insurrection in 1899; and, beginning in 1950, the Korean Augmentation to the US Army (KATUSA) program which continues today in the Republic of the Korea.

In both programs, indigenous civilians were accepted into US Army units to backfill vacancies created early in conflicts in East Asia. The Philippine Scouts formed battalion-size elements under the leadership of American officers and non-commissioned officers. In Korea, KATUSAs became individual replacements. Today, Korean citizens who are members of the ROK Army (ROKA) serve as low-ranking KATUSAs in US Army units in lieu of compulsory service in the ROKA.

Both programs were extremely effective and important. Yet, little has been recorded in the way of military writings which determine the basis for this extraordinary performance in combat and, today, in peacetime. In stark contrast, the most recent combat example of the use of indigenous natives in the US Army occurred in Vietnam and is determined largely to have been an institutional failure.

It can be concluded that the US Army is not well-prepared today for employment of indigenous soldiers in future conflicts since little has been done to remember past lessons during the last 100 years.

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Part I: COMBINED FORCES IN EAST ASIA

INTRODUCTION

Peace is breaking out around the world. For any number of reasons, a consensus in American opinion is building around the notion that, unlike the recent past, a large, forward-deployed US military presence is no longer required in East Asia. As the military capabilities of certain allies improve, the size of US permanent parties stationed overseas can and will be smaller. US national security interests demand that the US remains permanently engaged, but in a way that will get the job done with fewer American military forces involved. To do this, the US must search for efficiencies and examples of economies in force which will allow the US to maintain a positive but smaller, in terms of numbers of Americans, influence in the region.¹

For a variety of reasons and under varying circumstances, in this century the American Army has repeatedly employed indigenous soldiers (or native auxiliaries) to augment expeditionary forces and colonial armies in combat. Upon implementation of the idea, almost any example of this occurrence has had a lot to do with resource conservation. But, more compelling advantages drove the impetus behind this concept in that indigenous soldiers brought expertise into American armies which simply did not otherwise exist. Nevertheless, the fact remains that in many scenarios, foreign citizens were cheaper to employ than American soldiers.

Understandably, American military history often seems to have overlooked the lessons learned from these experiences. So few American soldiers have been associated with these units that

the story has seldom been carried forward across succeeding generations. Unlike American soldiers who would hardly tolerate integration as individuals or small units into a foreign army under the command and control of non-US leaders, many foreign citizens fondly recall the memories of their service in American units. And, in the sense that these foreign soldiers were American mercenaries for service in their own country, the concept may have further utility some day in the future in a part of the world which will tolerate it or has tolerated it in the past.

Whether or not a future application of this concept calls for large formations of indigenous soldiers under American command or individuals carefully assigned and integrated into existing American units, the possibilities for very positive cost/benefit outcomes are innumerable. Conceptually, indigenous soldiers assigned to American units will save vast sums of money.

Moreover, since military service overseas will be a rare occurrence for many career soldiers in the future, regional expertise and experience will likely decline.² Indigenous soldiers, who will appreciate their environment and the tactical implications facing American soldiers, will be prepared to assist US contingency forces which deploy to Asia for combat in the future. Expertise of this nature will not otherwise be easily replicated in US units.

If for no other reason, indigenous soldiers will know the language and most Americans will not. In Asia, it is not uncommon for interoperability capabilities between American units

and allied armies to be severely limited because of language barriers. It is quite normal to find combined operations between US and allied armies at the highest headquarters, largely because the most fluent (in English conversational skills) and talented allied officers are hand-picked for these special, high-visibility combined assignments. At the tactical level, it is almost impossible for either allied or US units to communicate and, therefore, operate together because the challenge of the language barrier is seemingly insurmountable. At the lowest levels, command and control between allied units is otherwise an art of intuitive perceptions.

If it is true, as some will say today, that in the next war the United States will always fight jointly, with multiple US military services from US air-land-sea components, and usually combined, with other allied forces, it is imperative that lessons learned from previous experiences be brought forth for re-examination and application. Allied forces which are combined at the lowest level will have impressive opportunities for success, especially in Asia. Numerous impediments will spring up to thwart the best intentions of any program which is initiated; however, commanders who are sensitive to the task can make it work.

Beginning in 1899 and lasting through the end of World War II, military history from the Philippine Islands has set an important precedent for the idea that US forces can be augmented by additional units composed of indigenous civilians. The Philippine Scouts was such a program. Again, the idea was

implemented in July 1950 in the Republic of Korea (ROK),³ based on an informal agreement between Korean President Syngman Rhee and General of the Army MacArthur. Today, just as in 1950, the Korean Augmentation to the US Army (KATUSA) Program provides individual Korean soldiers to selected US military units stationed in South Korea. These two examples from East Asia demonstrate that similar programs, one providing units of indigenous soldiers and one supplementing existing US units with individual replacements of indigenous soldiers, are feasible in the future because they have been proven useful for the last one hundred years.

If conflict arises in East Asia, it would be in the best interest of US units committed to the conflict to become integrally combined, whenever possible, by the incorporation of both allied officers and soldiers throughout the US command. The precedence for this exists today in various high-level US/Allied units in South Korea. In contrast, the KATUSA Program only extends to the rank of sergeant in small units at the lowest tactical levels. Operationally and tactically, clear advantages would be gained by conventional units fighting in a major conflict at the highest intensity levels of conflict. The prospect for considering this proposal in a future scenario is worth pursuing.

Purpose and Objectives

The purpose of this study is to examine US military history, particularly in the first year of fighting during the Philippine Insurrection, in order to analyze the historical precedent set by

the US Army in the use of indigenous soldiers in an East Asian country at the beginning of this century. Coupled with this effort, reflection on the experiences of the author in South Korea during the last ten years offers an opportunity to record the impressions of a former infantry battalion commander who served multiple unaccompanied short-tours to the same battalion where approximately 100 KATUSA soldiers were assigned. The objectives of this study are to: identify historical precedents and applicable lessons learned from recent experience regarding the employment of indigenous soldiers in portions of the US Army deployed overseas; gain an appreciation for the difficulties and advantages in each instance; and, establish a sense of relevance for future applications in East Asia.

Background

For the last 100 years, the US Army has been using indigenous soldiers to augment American units in Northeast and Southeast Asia. During times of both conventional and unconventional conflict overseas, the US Army has shown extraordinary resilience and flexibility in pursuing these important programs.

Equally extraordinary has been the US Army's knack for overlooking the lessons of history, as it did in Vietnam, leading to the failure of the Kit Carson Scout program. Although the First Marine Division under Major General Herman Nickerson began this highly successful experiment in 1966, it took the US Army four years to replicate it. In the end, the US Army mismanaged it out of existence, employing these marvelous assets as rear-

echelon barbers and hired laborers instead of frontline scouts and stalkers of the enemy.⁴

Over and over, history shows that the successful implementation of such a program has been largely dependent on the senior leadership. The brilliant conventional warfare campaigners in the Philippines--Generals Arthur MacArthur, Henry Lawton, and Samuel Young--were veterans of the Civil War and the Indian Wars. They experienced first-hand the utility of using Indians to fight Indians. These leaders authorized the Philippine Scouts units which were organized within six months of the Insurrection's beginning, nearly concluding the campaign three months later with the near-capture of the rebel leader in 1899.

During the Korean War, the KATUSAs joined US units within days of the beginning of the conflict. The program, as it exists today in peacetime, swings between success and questionable utility, largely depending on US military leaders who either nurture it or ignore it.

Perhaps a brief study of past events will ease the burden of US Army soldiers who are called to fight again in Asia. Truly, the use of American mercenaries at the tactical level can significantly lever the odds against a conventional or unconventional enemy on an Asian battlefield.

Part II: NATIVE SCOUT BATTALIONS IN THE LEAD OF AMERICAN DIVISIONS

THE PHILIPPINE SCOUTS


When fighting broke out in Manila between American soldiers

and Filipino insurgents on 4 February 1899, the US Army's expeditionary force of 15,000 volunteers had no way of knowing that they would be fighting, then occupying, this distant country for a period of many years.⁵ Clearly, this was the first colonial experience overseas for the United States.

Fortuitously, the US Army was no neophyte to the type of warfare which would follow. Heavy American divisional ground forces were pitted against the lightly armed Filipino insurgents who, after a short but bloody conventional phase, came to favor unconventional tactics. The American Army had seen its share of light-marching, fast-moving warfare over and over again in the United States--west of the Mississippi River.⁶ Up until 1898, the US Army had fought 943 skirmishes and battles during 33 years of continuous campaigning in the Indian Wars.⁷

The US Army recognized that maneuver elements could be outfoxed in alien territory, especially when confronting a crafty and savage opponent. The field expedient solution seemed to lead to the recruitment of indigenous scouts. In January 1865, the US Army officially recruited, uniformed, and swore in Company A, Pawnee Scouts under the leadership of Frank and Luther North.⁸ Another great American general of the period, Brigadier General George Crook, recognized that only indigenous soldiers who fought and thought like the enemy could successfully find the enemy. He would hire Apaches, always under the leadership and control of great chiefs of scouts like Al Sieber, to hunt down other Indian renegades during his expedition into northern Mexico in 1883. The idea was to beat Indians with Indians.⁹

Thus, when the battle was joined in the Philippines in 1899,




the notion of using Filipinos to fight under US control against the insurgents had been tried before by the Americans and other European colonial powers of the time. The US Army leadership in the Philippines had, to a significant degree, seen plenty of similar combat in the American West. This was a proven option during the Indian Wars; it was only logical that it would be considered again

in the Philippines.

A Conventional Fight in 1899

When the 60,000 soldiers of Eighth US Army Corps finally went to war, tailored in two divisional units formed by two brigades in each, they were prepared to fight conventionally on the main island of Luzon.¹⁰ Arrayed against them were 25,000 Filipino revolutionaries, likewise organized in two divisional units, preparing to retreat northward from Manila in an attempt to trade space for time.¹¹

In three weeks, the fall campaign in the central plains of Luzon was over. Brilliantly, the US Army executed a classic double envelopment around the Filipino flanks and behind the main



body of revolutionaries.

In the west, a US brigade sailed by ship and, into the mountainous east, a US division marched overland.

A third maneuver element at divisional strength pushed the Filipinos northward up the middle and into the trap, resulting in the near-capture of the insurgent leader Emilio Aguinaldo. At this point, the Filipinos ceased to confront the Americans head-to-head

conventionally, and reverted to an unconventional insurgency effort that would drag on for three more years until the Insurrection's end was precipitated by the capture of Aguinaldo.¹²

The US fall campaign was marked by rapid execution under difficult, monsoonal conditions against an elusive enemy which, in the end, lost its capability to fight conventionally in

units above 40-man in size.¹³ By winter 1899, the US Army had gained control over the central Luzon plains. The Filipinos lost access to rice granaries and all of their artillery and ordnance during the campaign, thus eliminating their means for continuing the insurgency in a meaningful way.¹⁴

Remarkable American Leadership

Generals Henry Lawton and Arthur MacArthur, commanding

generals of First and Second Divisions

respectively, were remarkable field

commanders. Both were

highly decorated veterans

of the Civil War and the

Indian Wars.¹⁵ Moreover,

they knew how to fight

both conventionally and

unconventionally. US Army

doctrine at the time

avored the use of

American scouts which

operated in the advance

party of main bodies of

American units on the move

as well as on the flanks

to provide early

warning.¹⁶ These American scouts were

extraordinarily brave, winning 12 of 46 Medals of Honor awarded

Table 1 61

Key Supporters of Macabebes Scouts
Philippine Insurrection
1899 - 1902

Major General Henry W. Lawton

- Civil War veteran; Medal of Honor winner.
- Respected Indian fighter; captured Geronimo.
- Division Commander in Cuba and the Philippines.
- KIA 1899, Philippine Islands.

Brigadier General Samuel B. M. Young

- Civil War veteran.
- Indian fighter.
- Brigade Commander in Cuba and the Philippines.
- Later CG, US Army; retired LTC in 1904.

Colonel Frederick Funston

- Reporter during Indian Wars.
- Fought 4 years against Spanish in Cuba.
- 1899, awarded Medal of Honor in Philippines.
- 1901, Scouts capture Aguinaldo, insurgent leader.
- Promoted to brigadier general.

First Lieutenant M. A. Batson

- July 1899, won Medal of Honor, Philippines.
- August 1899, battalion commander of Batson's Scouts organized...all divisions use Scouts.
- November 1899, CPT Batson wounded; recommended for 2d Medal of Honor.

during the three-year Insurrection.¹⁷

But the American scouts were being killed and wounded in disproportionate numbers in skirmish after skirmish.¹⁸ Clearly, the US Army recognized the value of scouts and committed them over and over again into the most precarious engagements. This, coupled with adverse unit mobility conditions in a country nearly devoid of a trafficable road network, restricted the heavy American units to the few existing thoroughfares.¹⁹ Tactically, this was a great opportunity for insurgent ambush. Scouts were essential for preventing the attrition of American units in transit.

The American military leadership sought innovative proposals from any echelon in the command.²⁰ Soon, officials recognized that light watercraft were advantageous along the many streams and waterways which crisscrossed the cultivated lowlands. Lieutenant Batson, an American scout, came across the Macabebe tribe which was renown for its ability to use the banca, a native canoe, for transport.²¹ By accident, the Macabebes were also terrific warriors and intertribal enemies of the Filipino revolutionaries.²² In August 1899, Lieutenant Batson was allowed to employ 100 Macabebes as civilians in the US Quartermaster Corps. Under US cadre leadership, Macabebe NCOs were selected and the indigenous scout units were trained.

On 7 November 1899, BG Young issued Field Orders Number 7 (See Appendix G) which outlined his campaign plan for conducting the flank attack on foot into the Caraballos Mountains and around the east flank of the retreating Filipino

revolutionary forces. In the lead was a battalion of Batson's Scouts. During the month, the Macabebes moved quickly, capturing enemy supplies, weapons, and field orders.²³

In General MacArthur's Second Division, the Macabebes were never used as a separate maneuver element and remained at company-size in strength.²⁴ In stark contrast, General Lawton's First Division employed them as a battalion-size maneuver force in the advance guard for his main body which consisted of BG Young's brigade. Young's brigade led the First Division into the mountains of the east flank, forming an enveloping attack. General Lawton placed the Macabebe's under Lieutenant Batson's leadership where they were instrumental in breaking the trail and pursuing the disorganized retreat of the Filipino revolutionaries.²⁵ On 14 November, BG Young rafted across the Agno River and attacked the security element of the insurgent leader's main body. Batson's Macabebes had missed the insurgent leader by two hours. However, they succeeded in causing the disintegration of the enemy's conventional army, though the fight would continue unconventionally for three more years.²⁶

In February 1901, Congress passed a law (See Appendix H) which authorized 12,000 native scouts.²⁷ Later, during a separate campaign in northern Luzon in March 1901, General Frederick Funston and 81 Macabebe scouts, posing as captured American POWs and scouts, located Aguinaldo in his hideout and seized him. Following the capture of Aguinaldo and the collapse of his infrastructure, the Philippine Insurrection ended in less than a year.²⁸

Although other native tribes were recruited as indigenous scouts in American units, none gained more fame than the Macabebes. In large part, this was due to leaders who were deeply interested in the project: Lawton, Young, Batson, and Funston. Offspring organizations, such as the Philippine Scouts and Philippine Constabulary, would exist in the Philippines until after World War II, when the Philippines gained its independence from the United States.

Attributes of a Filipino Scouts

Unlike the American Indians, the Macabebes were not especially good at land navigation or in hunting.²⁹ They were recruited to fill in the blanks of American scout units which had been created by high casualty rates in 1899. Under American leadership, the Macabebes excelled in performing their scouting mission. But their expertise was gained by on-the-job training under the careful guidance of American officers and NCOs.

Over time, the Macabebes became adept at sorting out Tagalog tribe revolutionaries from the civilian population because of the unique dialects and physical differences which existed between tribes. Instinctively, the Macabebes knew when and where the revolutionaries would fight, how he would recruit, when he would visit towns and barrios, and exactly where he would hide his equipment and weapons.³⁰

Filipino scouts were accustomed to life in the tropics, jungles, swamps, and mountains of the Philippines. They seemed to be immune to problems which caused American soldiers to suffer greatly: exposure, heat, intestinal disorders, and contaminated

water. Inherently, each Macabebe scout had a dormant warrior spirit which was invaluable to the American cause.³¹

Although the Macabebes appeared less effective than the Indian scouts which the US Army employed during the Indian Wars, he was nonetheless fearsome to the Filipino revolutionaries he fought. To his credit, US leaders at the time believed that the use of the Macabebes shortened the war in Luzon by a good measure.³²

Part III: US AND KOREAN SOLDIERS SERVING TOGETHER

THE KOREAN KATUSA PROGRAM

Since the beginning of the Korean War over four decades ago, American Army officers and enlisted soldiers have served in the Republic of Korea (ROK). Especially in the divisional units deployed north of Seoul and up into the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), US veterans of the Korean experience have served one-year, unaccompanied tours of duty. Those who experienced combat can speak to the bitterness and hardship of that challenge. To the others who have served in Korea during the most recent years of an uneasy truce, the experience has been unique and dangerous, for there are many tigers to be faced on mainland Asia.

During each of the past 41 years, Korean Augmentation to the US Army (KATUSA) Program soldiers have been assigned to US units throughout all of Eighth US Army.³³ Today, approximately 5,600 KATUSAs serve in US units until their individual military service commitment is complete; then they are discharged after approximately 30 months of total military service.³⁴ Originally, their purpose was to fill out US units and to gain military

experience otherwise not available in Korean units.³⁵ Today, KATUSAs primarily serve to increase the readiness and operational capabilities of the US units to which they are assigned.³⁶

Few US soldier leave Korea without a distinct impression of the KATUSA Program. KATUSAs are integrated into every section of a unit and, by Eighth US Army regulation, are required to billet with US soldiers.³⁷ For many American soldiers, this means they will have roommates who are indigenous Korean citizens, since the ubiquitous quonset huts that provided barracks living in years past have almost been entirely replaced by dormitory-style accommodations with private, 3-man rooms.

US leaders are often overwhelmed with unique personnel considerations that are attendant to having foreign nationals in otherwise purely US units. By itself, the language barrier is almost insurmountable. Moreover, the cultural differences are great, causing mutual friction and dissatisfaction. The weight of the many burdens which accompany this program nearly suffocate those who must live with it on a daily basis.

Yet, the incredible individual potential of the typical Korean citizen who finds himself in an American unit can prove to be enormously beneficial to a combat unit, in both peacetime and war. Clearly, US unit leadership makes or breaks the bond which can be formed between individuals and groups of soldiers, US and Korean alike. At small unit level, the KATUSA Program can become a bitter failure or a stunning success, depending almost entirely on the unit commander.

A Case Study: 2/503 Infantry, Camp Hovey

As a case in point, an examination of a single infantry

Table 2 ⁶²			
KATUSA TDA, 2/503 Inf 1988-1990			
Unit	Section	Ranks	# KATUSA
Bn	KATUSA PAC	E4-5	4
	Co Sr KATUSA	E5	5

HHC	Co Sup & NBC	E3-4	2
	S-1 (Pers)	E4-5	3
	Med	E4	1
	S-2 (Intel)	E4	1
	S-3 (Opns/Tng)	E4	1
	S-4 (Supply)	E5	1
	Mtr Pool	E3	2

A/B/C	Co Sup & NBC	E3-4	2
Cos	Rifle Plts	E3-5	9
	Wpns Plt	E3-4	3

CSC	Co Sup & NBC	E3-4	2
	Anti-Tk Plts	E3-5	18
	Mortar Plt	E3-5	4
	Scout Plt	E3-5	3

Bn Total			89
Notes: 1/ HHC is Headquarters and Headquarters Company.			
2/ A/B/C Cos are the 3 infantry line companies: Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie.			
3/ CSC is the Cbt Spt Company.			
4/ KATUSA PAC is the Personnel Admin Center.			

battalion will highlight the advantages and disadvantages of the KATUSA Program. When the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry Regiment (abbreviated 2/503 Infantry) inactivated for the third time on 17 August 1990 at Camp Hovey in the Republic of Korea, it temporarily ended a distinguished military record that began in May 1941. Its combat record included the airborne assault on Corregidor Island in the Philippines during World War II, for which it acquired the nickname "Rock Force," as well as service during the Vietnam War. After 4 years in Korea, including annual 100-day

rotations into the DMZ as the principal US combat unit in the US sector, one of the first elements of the battalion to stand-down was a collective body of KATUSA soldiers who were honored at a special ceremony at Camp Hovey on 5 July 1990.³⁸

In no small way, 89 KATUSA soldiers (who were first

and foremost Korean citizens and ROK Army soldiers) contributed immensely to the combat capabilities of the Battalion. Authorized in a unique KATUSA Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) shown at Table 2,³⁹ these KATUSA soldiers were individually assigned across each of the 5 organic companies in the Battalion. Although the Battalion required US staffing to fill 740 enlisted positions, only 666 US soldiers were authorized in accordance with the approved personnel allowance.⁴⁰

Quantitatively, the KATUSA Program filled out the US personnel who were not forthcoming insofar as the US personnel manning documents were concerned. But, this was largely a coincidence. During US Army of Excellence (AOE) modernizations in the mid-1980s, the US Army scaled back the size of selected organizational designs. This allowed the US Army to create more units from the existing aggregate force structure by reducing the number of soldiers at small-unit level.⁴¹ Thus, the

numerous doctrinal vacancies at small-unit level in US units--spaces which no longer existed as they had been eliminated in order to create more divisional organizations--were, in reality, backfilled in Korea by KATUSA soldiers. Assuming that

Table 3 63			
CRITICAL COMBAT SYSTEMS, 2/503 Inf			
1988-1990			
Bn System	# Auth Enl Pers		Major Cbt Systems
	KATUSA	US	
9 Rifle Plts	27	333	27 Rifle Sqds
3 Wpns Plt	9	57	9 @ 81 ILO 60mm
3 Anti-Tk Plts	18	63	18 TOWs
Mortar Plt	4	25	4 @ 4.2 ILO 181mm
Scout Plt	3	26	5 Scout Squads
	-----	-----	
Bn Total	61	504	
Notes: 1/ TOWs are anti-tank guided missiles.			
2/ In lieu of (ILO).			

KATUSA soldiers were as productive as their US counterparts, US units in Korea were more robust because of the KATUSA Program. In contrast, small units in the rest of what has been labeled an "anemic" US Army force structure⁴² learned to live without that portion of their force structure which had been carved back at the margin in order to create more US units under AOE.

KATUSAs: Critical Combat Multipliers

The KATUSA program in 2/503 Infantry was critical for a single reason: it provided enlisted manpower for important combat systems. Out of 89 KATUSA positions on the KATUSA TDA (See Table 3 and, for more details, see Appendix D), 61 KATUSA soldiers supplemented the Battalion's US enlisted manning document in significant infantry slots which were associated with 5 key combat systems in the Battalion.

At a glance, this appears to have been a 12 % windfall which served to keep the Battalion overfilled in enlisted soldiers. This was not the case if one challenges the Battalion's AOE Authorizations by going back in the US Army's history to determine original doctrinal requirements for these systems. Retired General W.E DePuy's 1958 article, "11 Men, 1 Mind," fluidly outlined the intellectual and intuitive concepts which called for a 11-man Infantry Squad.⁴³ As late as 1980, the US Army's doctrinal Field Manual for the Infantry Squad still supported the 11-man concept.⁴⁴ As shown at Table 4, historic doctrinal documents for the other systems required more enlisted soldiers than the AOE manpower authorizations allowed. Only in the case of the Infantry Squad and the 81mm Mortar Squad did the

AOE requirement match historical doctrinal requirements; however, the 2/503 Infantry Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) only allowed for a 10-man Infantry Squad and a 4.6-man 81mm Mortar Squad. Without KATUSA soldiers, the Battalion would have been

operating key weapon systems manned with too few US soldiers.

Numerically, KATUSA soldiers put meat back onto the force structure skeleton of the Battalion. In the Battalion, a KATUSA

Table 4 64		
US Army Doctrinal AOE Understaffing 1988-1989		
System	Historic Doctrinal Requirement	2/503 Inf Authorization
Inf Rifle Squad	11 soldiers	10 US soldiers
4.2in Mort Squad	7 soldiers	5 US soldiers
81mm Mort Squad	5 soldiers	4.6 US soldiers
Inf Scout Squad	NA	5 US soldiers
TOW Squad	4 soldiers	3 US soldiers

was authorized for every infantry rifle squad, every mortar squad, every scout squad, and every TOW squad. Physically, the Battalion acquired manpower to meet force structure shortfall. However, when carefully integrated into each unit and motivated to mission accomplishment, KATUSA soldiers became terrific combat multipliers in the Korean scenario.

KATUSA Capabilities

Man-for-man, KATUSA soldiers were not unlike their US counterparts. Individually, they were young, idealistic and physically fit. Their knowledge of the military was very limited and would be largely shaped by their first few months in their new military unit. But in important ways based on their unique situations, they brought expertise to units which could not be replicated by US soldiers.

Almost every US soldier and officer served a 12-month unaccompanied tour of duty in Korea. As a result of US personnel turnover, unit commanders faced extraordinary personnel turbulence. When measured, it was not uncommon for units to suffer 10% personnel turnover each month. When rolled up on a quarterly basis, nearly one-third of a US unit was newly arrived at any point in time. Operational continuity was virtually impossible to maintain. But KATUSA soldiers normally stayed in US units for 27 months, after which they would process out of military service and re-enter civilian life. As a group, many KATUSAs had been through the annual training cycle and were a great source of lessons learned.

KATUSAs assigned to the Battalion brought incredible academic credentials with them. Unlike their US contemporaries,

Table 5 65		
KATUSA		
Academic Qualifications		
2/503 Infantry		
As Of: August 1989		
08/89 Unit	# KATUSA Auth/Assigned	Ave # Yrs College
HHC	16/13	2.08
A Co	15/13	1.77
B Co	15/11	1.91
C Co	15/13	1.92
CSC	28/22	2.00
Bn Total	89/72	1.94

almost every KATUSA soldier had 2 years or more of college (see Table 5) across a variety of impressive academic subject areas (see Appendices A and B). These academic credentials set them apart from almost every group of US soldiers in combat units.

This raw talent was not obvious if the unit did not seek out ways to exploit it. For the most part, KATUSAs held very junior positions in small infantry units. By regulation, they were prohibited from serving as full-time duty soldiers who simply performed housekeeping functions.⁴⁵

They pulled their share of the daily chores that most soldiers and civilian youngsters hate.

From a military standpoint, KATUSAs enhanced the interoperability capabilities of any small unit to which they were assigned. In an environment that was completely foreign to US soldiers, they could bridge language barriers in local communities or between ROKA and US units. During combat patrolling on the DMZ, KATUSAs served in their normal infantry capacity on the patrol but also performed language translation functions.⁴⁶ This was especially important in the gathering of intelligence or interpreting propaganda broadcasts along the DMZ. In a crisis situation, they could assist in debriefing enemy prisoners.

Annually, infantry soldiers and officers have the opportunity to compete for the Expert Infantryman Badge (EIB). Infantry units spend weeks of training and testing at the individual level across a broad spectrum of critical infantry skills.⁴⁷ Only a very few infantry soldiers meet the prerequisites to earn the EIB. In 1988, a phenomenal year by any record, 83 officers and soldiers in the Battalion were awarded this badge. Of these, 10 KATUSAs mastered the intricate testing requirements...in English. By comparison, only 10 officers were successful. In 1989, 16 KATUSAs out of 43 KATUSA candidates were awarded the EIB, setting a record for the highest EIB recipient rate of any unit in the 2d Infantry Division. By any standard and in any language, this 37% conversion rate from candidate to recipient was astounding.

Based on annual EIB performance, KATUSAs were as skilled and individually productive as American soldiers in any US infantry unit in the world, regardless of a KATUSA's relatively limited experience in the military and in US units. Moreover, to reach this achievement a KATUSA had to master the difficult English language and undergo the numerous examinations before American NCOs who administered the hands-on and written EIB skill testing.

Because the Korean environment could be dangerous to unsuspecting US units, KATUSAs were instrumental in warning units about monsoonal floods, the dangers of cold weather injuries, practices and operating procedures of ROKA units, and a myriad of other hazards that challenged operational units on the peninsula. During daily life in garrison, KATUSAs helped US soldiers cope with the customs and courtesies of dealing with merchants in nearby villages. When incidents occurred between US soldiers and Korean civilians, KATUSAs bridged the language barrier, helping to make amends to the mutual satisfaction of both parties.

KATUSA Command and Control

In addition to the assigned 89 KATUSA soldiers, a seasoned ROKA noncommissioned officer (NCO) was attached to the Battalion in order to assist with total personnel and administrative management of the KATUSA Program. In practice, he often became an advisor to the US battalion commander with regard to KATUSA matters, deploying and training with the US unit when required. Further, this ROKA Sergeant Major disseminated ROKA directives down to the KATUSAs and reported back through ROKA administrative channels to the Commander, ROKA Support Group, who ultimately

responded to the Chief of Staff of the ROK Army.⁴⁸

Thus, two channels of control operated in the 2/503 Infantry with regard to the KATUSA Program. First, the US chain of command, under the authority of US officer commanders, was responsible for the command and control of all KATUSAs and the ultimate success or failure of the command. The US chain of command was supplemented by a US NCO chain of communication. In Korea, the US chain of command extended upward through the US brigade commander and the divisional commander to the Commander, Eighth US Army. Secondly, KATUSAs, who were Korean citizens and ROKA soldiers but were assigned to a US unit, were also administratively supervised by their own ROKA Sergeant Major who responded to both the US chain of command as well as upward into ROKA channels. In contrast to US doctrinal command relationships with regard to attachment, the ROKA retained disciplinary and punitive responsibility for all KATUSAs and certain other personnel action responsibilities.⁴⁹

Although the KATUSA command and control relationships proved to be awkward at times, in most units it seemed to work satisfactorily. Lurking in the minds of many US commanders was the possibility that, in time of crisis or war, the KATUSAs would be removed from US control. This, in fact, happened during September and October 1988 when Seoul hosted the Summer Olympics. Without prior coordination within the US division, the KATUSAs in the 2d Infantry Division were restricted to their US unit installations via the ROKA chain.⁵⁰ This seemed to suggest that should North Korea take aggressive action during this sensitive

period, that the ROKA might have other designs on KATUSA soldiers in US units. Clearly, two strings were on each KATUSA, creating considerable consternation among young leaders at company command level where control and training of individual US and KATUSA soldiers was the focal point of effort.

KATUSA and US Soldier Interaction

US soldiers assigned to Korea undergo an environmental shock that is seldom anticipated and is often misunderstood. Normally, the village environment which exists outside many US bases does not represent mainstream Korea and, in many instances, is emotionally upsetting for both Koreans and Americans. It was almost always an embarrassment to KATUSAs who had likewise never been exposed to the seedy bars and discos which offered a diversion to a soldier's barracks life. This was especially true for forward-deployed, combat units which spent most of the time in field training or on the DMZ.

The Korean government offered numerous opportunities for travel around the country. Unless a soldier had the time and inclination, many never had the opportunity to gain exposure to the tourist attractions and cultural exhibits in large cities. For combat unit soldiers, time was measured in days remaining in-country or until the end of the current field exercise, the last patrol on the DMZ, or the flight home at the end of the US soldier's tour. The only link between traditional Korea and the US soldier may have been in the KATUSA soldier who lived and served with the US soldier on a daily basis. Sadly, KATUSA soldiers and US GIs were easily repelled by their many

differences.

KATUSAs were drafted out of college, interrupting intensive academic preparation for a life in Korea that rewards educational excellence and hard work. For many GIs in combat units, the US Army followed high school and was a voluntary decision to, at least temporarily, end one's academic training and try the US Army for fun, experience, or a career opportunity.

As a group, KATUSAs were driven by an insatiable appetite to study English quietly or read books. Their military careers were a brief stop-out that would be followed, in a short time, by more college and then competition to seek employment in a country which may have the highest per capita number of doctorates in the world.⁵¹ Korean society is coherent in its Confucian belief in hard work, thrift, filial piety, and national pride.⁵²

Table 6 66			
English Language Training Program for KATUSAs 2/503 Infantry			
As of: Feb 1990			
Unit	Asgn	Test	Ave Score
HHC	13	9	67.8
A Co	14	12	77.2
B Co	15	11	65.0
C Co	14	13	62.1
CSC	25	21	73.6
Bn Tot	81	66	69.8

By Eighth US Army regulation, they received 59 hours of English language training during their 3-month basic training, to be followed thereafter by 20-hour blocks twice each year while they served in US units.⁵³ The English Language Training Program for KATUSAs (ELTPK) in US units was administered by the local US Army's Education Center, which offered classes to all soldiers in a variety of academic courses. As shown at Table 6, the average ELTPK score was slightly below 70. On an individual basis, a sub-70 score

required remedial training. As a snapshot at a particular point in time, the KATUSAs in 2/503 Infantry were not proficient in their mandatory English training. This situation was not uncommon. Although Koreans study English throughout their formative years, their conversational skills do not always equal their reading/writing capabilities.

Hence, KATUSAs were highly motivated and constant students of English language training. While the US Army leadership in Korea was focused on warfighting capabilities, KATUSAs sought every opportunity to study. Their American counterparts seldom understood this fierce drive to excel in the academic arena. Further, American soldiers seemed to resent KATUSAs who struggled with their almost selfish, individual academic endeavors while US GIs pulled lonely tours of duty in Korea, away from family, friends, and an American lifestyle which US soldiers sorely missed.

When a KATUSA arrived in a US unit, he was an immediate burden on the US training managers because KATUSAs only receive basic training. In contrast, even the most inexperienced US soldiers receive advanced training related to their Military Occupational Specialty (MOS).⁵⁴ At the outset, US units had to establish formal On-The-Job (OJT) programs to train-up KATUSAs for their assigned MOS and duty position.

For the most part, the progress of KATUSA OJT and ELTPK status was not an item of concern to US senior leadership, insofar as training readiness was concerned. That it was being accomplished seemed more important than the level of

excellence being achieved. Unfortunately, KATUSAs valued highly these events and so did smart US commanders at unit level.

In many ways, KATUSAs had no choice other than quiet study or association among their own Korean friends in a US unit. As Table 7 shows, KATUSA pay was extraordinarily low in comparison to what a US soldier made in the same unit, conceivably performing the same function or job. Although many KATUSA

Table 7 67				
Military Pay Comparison (KATUSA versus US Soldiers)				
Rank		Monthly	Bonus	Annual Pay
PVT	US	\$ 845	NA	\$ 10,140
	KATUSA	\$ 8	\$ 34	\$ 130
PFC	US	\$ 878	NA	\$ 10,536
	KATUSA	\$ 9	\$ 37	\$ 145
CPL	US	\$ 984	NA	\$ 11,808
	KATUSA	\$ 10	\$ 40	\$ 160
SGT	US	\$ 1,190	NA	\$ 14,280
	KATUSA	\$ 12	\$ 47	\$ 191
Notes: 1/ Exchange Rate: \$ 1 = 700 Won.				
2/ 1991 US Military Pay Table.				
3/ US Base Pay for Yrs of Service:				
PVT/PFC...Under 2 YOS				
CPL.....2 YOS				
SGT.....5 YOS				

soldiers were monetarily supplemented by their families, they did not have the same discretionary spending opportunities as their US counterparts. By Eighth US Army regulation,⁵⁵ US units provided many services and supplies to KATUSA soldiers at no cost. Such things as free movies, free haircuts, laundry soap, clothing maintenance allowances, space-available medical, optical and dental

care, limited in-country mail service, free US quartermaster service, and a KATUSA PX were arranged. In the end, KATUSAs were unable to pay for many of the pleasures and material benefits which GIs brought into the same environment in the way of TVs, VCRs, and spending opportunities in the Korean villages.

Universally, most US soldiers hated two aspects of the

KATUSA system in US units: the KATUSA promotion system and KATUSA holidays. Simply, KATUSAs were allowed to take

Table 68 Military Promotion Comparison (KATUSA versus US Soldiers)		
Rank		Normal Time in Service
PFC	US	about 12 mons
	KATUSA	at 5 months

CPL	US	about 26 mons
	KATUSA	at 12 months

SGT	US	about 60 mons
	KATUSA	at 20 months

all US and Korean holidays. For the most part, US soldiers enjoyed the same time off. But a few additional Korean holidays enjoyed only by KATUSAs gave US soldiers the notion that KATUSAs did not have to work as hard as Americans. This was trivial when compared to the KATUSA promotion system which accelerated KATUSAs

during their 27-month careers in an automatic fashion. While US soldiers normally did not receive promotion to the NCO rank of sergeant until about five years of US Army service, and only then after promotion board competition and central selection by the Department of the Army, KATUSAs would automatically be promoted during their last few months of service in the US unit at about 20 months of service. At this rank, a relatively inexperienced KATUSA could be placed in a leadership position over US soldiers.

Even at the rank of corporal, a leadership position in the US Army, this was source of considerable irritation. US soldiers detested this situation. KATUSAs were equally sensitive to a subversion in their opportunity to demonstrate their capabilities when a US unit sidestepped the situation by reassigning the KATUSA NCO to a non-leadership position to avoid placing US soldiers under KATUSA NCO leaders. The burden for resolving this difficult controversy was placed squarely on US leaders in small

units.

When KATUSA and US Relations Go Sour

Without general officer awareness and involvement,⁵⁶ the key nodes--the battalion and company commanders--can easily suffer "death by a thousand cuts,"⁵⁷ never understanding why KATUSA problems appear to have all the attributes of a race relations predicament, somewhat like those which the Army endured in the early 1970s. Young soldiers, both US and Korean, often fail to understand what is so troubling when the Program goes sour. It is left to the unit commanders to put the fixes in place and make the program work for the unit.

What is conceptually reasonable can easily escape the intuitive grasp of young US leaders who are not conditioned by a previous multi-cultural, bilingual experience to manage this Program. Regardless of one's rank, anyone can fail at making Korean-American relations work for the benefit of the unit. US leaders are often not prepared to respond to their varied and culturally diverse US and KATUSA constituencies.

In stark contrast, the individual attributes and characteristics of every pair of US and KATUSA soldiers are startlingly different. Misperceptions run rampant throughout a unit. An insensitive US chain of command will easily side with US soldiers who may be more vocal than KATUSAs in making complaints. KATUSA soldiers will often persevere in silence, but the symptoms of problems will come out in other ways, such as chronic fighting between US and KATUSA soldiers. Instantaneously, all of the KATUSAs in a battalion can easily become distraught

over a single incident, marshalling universal feelings of hate and contempt.

To avoid losing face, the US battalion ROK Army (ROKA) Sergeant Major, a seasoned ROKA noncommissioned officer (NCO), will have to approach the US battalion commander for problem resolution. Days will be consumed in the process of settling the situation to the mutual satisfaction of all parties. Neither the US nor KATUSA soldiers will soon forget the incident.

In years past, the ROKA Sergeant Major would likely have utilized routine brutality to silence his young KATUSA soldiers rather than confront the US battalion commander. In the ROKA, 2,765 soldiers died in a recent 8-year period as the result of harsh discipline or suicide.⁵⁸ Entire units have been beaten for the infraction of a single soldier. In the past, the US unit ROKA Sergeant Majors routinely carried this personal experience to KATUSA elements in US units. For the most part, Korean military society has most recently undergone a democratizing process which has helped to remove this treatment from KATUSA soldiers. By and large, many Korean citizens seek military service as KATUSA soldiers rather than ROKA service as a result.

The solution is in prevention rather than remedy after a US-KATUSA incident. By their initial orientation at the ROK basic training center, KATUSA soldiers are taught to seek help via US Army Equal Opportunity offices which are surreptitiously located down to brigade level. Rather than have problems trickle up to brigade level, US battalions can implement their own Equal Opportunity Council to better manage the numerous personal

management issues regarding KATUSAs in US units.

A key ingredient which can help make the KATUSA Program work really well is the perception of equality. Using equality as a theme for both US and KATUSA soldiers, US commanders can regularly manage their unit KATUSA Program during Equal Opportunity Council meetings. The time spent is minimal and is deeply appreciated by every KATUSA. Since unit commanders normally spend 90 percent of their time on US issues, US soldiers are seldom concerned that the battalion and company commanders as well as selected US NCO leaders are spending time on KATUSA matters. Equality is an elusive goal; however, the effort spent by key US commanders and leaders helps to foster the impression that the goal is worth the effort in any event.

Bottom Line

Clearly, KATUSAs in US units give versatility, resilience, manpower depth, and operational stability to US unit readiness. In peacetime, the benefits of this program may be seemingly overshadowed by problems in garrison that are largely based on faults in human nature and, simply, a lack of cultural understanding. Neither US nor KATUSA soldiers have little first-hand experience or knowledge about each other. Unless the US chain of command is equally sensitive to both sides, without favoring the US position which is a natural reflexive response, then misperceptions will grow from this bias.

What is not easily measured in peacetime is the benefit to be gained during combat. Clearly, units which serve on the DMZ are dependent on KATUSAs because of the language similarities

between North and South Korea. Examples abound from the Korean War where US soldiers suffered and died because they were unable to adapt quickly to the Korean environment and populace. KATUSAs provide that connectivity to a strange, unknown environment which conceivably makes them important combat multipliers. They could possibly change the outcome of combat for US units at the small-unit level in the next war.

Thus, the longstanding marriage of the KATUSA Program to numerous US units which have served in Korea over the last 4 decades is a model program which may have applicability elsewhere in East Asia where similar conditions exist. The Program does not operate well when left to its own destiny. Rather, US leaders must work it continuously, overcoming the proclivity of the youth involved from two different societies to understand and appreciate the importance of the relationship to the overall success of all soldiers in the unit.

Part IV: A PRECEDENCE FOR A FUTURE US ARMY IN EAST ASIA

CONCLUSIONS

Had it not been for the willing and innovative senior leaders in the Philippines who were experienced Indian fighters as well as recognized experts in major unit-level warfare, Lieutenant Batson would not have been allowed to incorporate the Macabebes into his American scout unit. Under Batson's caring leadership, he was able to turn traitorous outlaws against their own countrymen in a mid-intensity war. The result was the near-termination of the conflict within the first year of fighting. Three years later, the Macabebes would succeed in capturing the

revolutionary leader, largely bringing the Philippine Insurrection to an end.

In this instance, Macabebe Scouts were formed into battalion-size units under American leadership. Understandably, many Americans doubted the loyalty of the Macabebes. What they brought to the American effort was bilingual continuity and environmental familiarity plus a willingness to die for the Americans. Unsupervised, they terrorized the civilian population, sticking the Americans with propaganda liabilities which could be used later against the American cause. In at least bringing the Macabebes under American control, some believed this alone was a great service to the average Filipino civilian.

What facilitated the rapid utilization of native auxiliaries during the Philippine Insurrection was the deep base of recent combat experience that existed within the leadership ranks of the US Army, from the most junior to senior levels. From the Indian campaigns, US Army officers and NCOs knew that Indian scouts, who were led by competent American soldiers, could offer expedient solutions to many tactical problems in the field.

In the simplest tactical terms, the Macabebes were needed to replace American scouts who were being rapidly attrited in combat during the early months of the campaign. The cost was cheap and the American commanders exploited them until they were physically ineffective on the battlefield due to exhaustion.

For military and civilians in the United States, it made perfect sense to give tactical commanders what they wanted,

as long as the cost was insignificant. That these natives were being exploited, at great personal risk to boot, was a moot issue. At the time, most Americans in Congress had limited interest in the welfare of indigenous populations around the globe.

Ironically, the Macabebes were not proficient military scouts. The skills they needed to backfill American scouts were acquired through training. Given requisite supervision, they became good soldiers. Once committed to a fight, they displayed a latent but strong warrior spirit. Moreover, once they became affiliated with the Americans, their extended family and friends became American sympathizers. Obviously, the Macabebes were well-treated by the Americans.

Because of avid command interest at the highest US Army levels in theatre, the experiment was a success and was institutionalized in the Philippines until after the end of World War II. Certainly, there were significant exceptions. Some leaders, such as Major General Arthur MacArthur, failed to use them to any degree. In contrast, Major General Lawton begged his corps commander for all of the available Macabebes. The stunning successes of the Macabebes occurred in Lawton's division until he was killed. Thereafter, Brigadier General Funston mentored the concept during his campaigns into northern Luzon which resulted in the capture of the insurgent leader, Aguinaldo.

If official records accurately account for the tremendous value of Americanizing, at least in uniform and pay, these mercenaries, it is amazing that this concept never took hold in

other American wars and times. Not unlike the expeditionary forces of other colonizing countries in the nineteenth century, the Americans in the Philippines were attracted, in a primitive way, to these natives who killed other Filipinos with gusto and enthusiasm. The Filipino Scout program was not a corollary excursion operating at the fringe of this campaign. Rather, Filipino Scout battalions led major American divisions into combat--within 6 months of the program's beginning.

Fifty years later and in a different part of East Asia, the US Army acquired KATUSA replacements to fill the depleted ranks of American units which had experienced tremendous loss rates in the first few months of the Korean War. Today, KATUSAs still serve as individual fillers in the US Army in the Republic of Korea. They are potentially instrumental to future combat success because, just as in the Philippines, they provide bilingual capability and in-country knowledge of the environment.

No Hope For The Future

The willingness of some Asians to subordinate their national identity and fight under the American colors is a Confucian phenomenon that may have outlived its future utility in familiar parts of Asia. Certainly, in Korea this may be true as the US moves from a lead role to a supporting role. Younger Korean generations are presently focused on reunification and do not necessarily view Korean peoples in the north as hated enemies. As for Americans today, many do not see the utility in the KATUSA Program given the problems which often accompany it. In peacetime, it does not seem to be worth the trouble.

The glue which makes interoperability possible in Korea is the bilingual capabilities of units which have KATUSAs. However, the deep hatred of an enemy in the north may be absent in the minds and psyche of future KATUSAs. Clearly, this ingredient was a key motivating factors that facilitated employment of Indians and Macabebes by the US Army.

Without the close attention of American leaders, any attempt to Americanize mercenaries in the future will probably fail. The Kit Carson Scout program in Vietnam is an example of a program which both succeeded and failed: for the US Marines, these Vietnamese defectors and rehabilitated prisoners were very important; for the US Army, the program failed to prosper in spite of the large numbers of individuals involved. In the end, it probably died a natural death because of leadership inattention, disinterest, and mismanagement.

Unfortunately, today's core of the conventional American military has neither the benefit of any extended combat experience with indigenous soldiers nor the long-term memory extending back forty years to a time when we last successfully used Asians to fight Asians in their own country. Why and how this was accomplished has not been honored in our military writings and thoughts. Doctrinely, it is a void. The US Army must intend not to consider it again.

Quite simply, the chauvinistic nature of expeditionary armies seems to lend a racist element of disregard to many who find themselves in charge of indigenous mercenaries. Some Americans hold the distinct bias that Asians are quite accustomed

to suffering. Under this philosophy, Asians would be insensitive to the needs of Americans if they were ever placed in superior positions over Americans. That these mercenary compatriots of American soldiers in the past have suffered and persevered under the most extreme conditions and disadvantages can be easily overlooked by young American leaders who have no experience with or innate compassion for them. In silence, they have served American leaders who may not have had the slightest interest in or appreciation for them. The most intelligent American leaders know, though, that any demonstrated care and concern for them will be repaid over and over.

Without firsthand experience in dealing with American mercenaries, the US Army can expect any future experiences to be awkward and unfruitful. As the American military becomes smaller and more firmly rooted in the continental United States, fewer American military leaders will have overseas experience. A decline in interest and understanding for the capabilities of indigenous comrades who are willing to fight for Americans can be anticipated.

That few military writings exist today of our history and propensity for employing American indigenous forces in our expeditionary armies is proof that the US Army has historically had a low regard for these results in the past.

APPENDIX A

KATUSA Academic Qualifications 2/503 Infantry, 2d Infantry Division Republic of Korea As Of: 8 January 1990¹

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>College/Univ</u>	<u># Yrs</u>	<u>Major</u>
HHC	SGT	Boo, EY	Che Ju Natl	3	Info Engr
	SGT	Choi, WK	Shin Gu Jr	1	Land Register
	SGT	Kim, JW	Korea	2	Bus Admin
	SGT	Lee, CR	Seoul Theo	3	Sociology
	CPL	Jo, YH	So Kang Grad	1	Korean Lit
	CPL	Ji, YI	Yeo Su Fishers	Grad	Aqua Culture
	CPL	No, IH	Chon Buk Natl	3	German Lit
	CPL	Song, TH	Han Yang	1	Mech Engr
	PFC	Lim, KJ	Yung Nam	2	Physics
	PFC	Kim, SK	Kun San	2	Intl Trade
	PFC	Kim, YC	Han Kuk For Lang	1	Law
	PVT	Lee, IH	Yung Nam Tech	1	Electronics

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>College/Univ</u>	<u># Yrs</u>	<u>Major</u>
A Co	SGT	Yoo, YH	Kyung Hee	1	Economics
	SGT	Jung, TD	Kum Ho Inst Tech	2	Electronics
	SGT	Jin, JH	Kyung Sang Natl	1	Civil Engr
	SGT	Jung, JS	Korea	3	Metal Engr
	CPL	Lee, HJ	Seoul Natl	2	Agri Economics
	CPL	Ryoo, HM	Dong Kuk	2	Korean History
	CPL	Han, DY	Yu Han Tech	1	Electricity
	CPL	Kim, NS	Dae Lim Tech Jr	Grad	Mech Design
	CFL	Kim, JM	Han Yang	2	Cptr Science
	CPL	Kim, CH	Mil Yang Jr	Grad	Landscape Arch
	PVT	Lee, MK	Jeon Nam	2	Intl Trade

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>College/Univ</u>	<u># Yrs</u>	<u>Major</u>
B Co	SGT	Kim, JB	Won Kwang	2	Pol Science
	SGT	Kang, JS	Sung Kyoong Kwan	3	Economics
	CPL	No, WS	Dong Kuk	1	Pol Science
	CPL	Lee, CK	Korea	3	Economics
	CPL	Lee, SB	A Ju	1	Economics
	CPL	Kwak, MM	Won Kwang	3	Management
	CPL	Joo, SD	Joong Ahng	1	Eng Literature
	PFC	Kwon, HK	Yon Sei	1	Mech Engr
	PFC	Choi, KM	Yon Sei	1	Law
	PVT	Park, HT	Tax Bus Jr	Grad	Domestic Tax

APPENDIX A (Continued)

KATUSA Academic Qualifications
2/503 Infantry, 2d Infantry Division
Republic of Korea
As Of: 8 January 1990

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>College/Univ</u>	<u># Yrs</u>	<u>Major</u>
C Co	SGT	Suh, BS	So Kang	1	Eng Literature
	SGT	Jang, YH	Han Yang Tech	Grad	Cptr Engr
	SGT	Park, JJ	Tan Kuk	3	French Literature
	SGT	Lee, KC	Won Kwang	1	Physics
	SGT	Hyun, WK	Yon Sei	1	Economics
	SGT	Jung, DM	Kun San	2	Chem Engr
	CPL	Kim, DH	So Kang	1	Management
	CPL	Park, SY	Yon Sei	4	Mech Engr
	CPL	Lee, JW	Yon Sei	2	Administration
	CPL	Kim, SK	Dong Nam Jr	Grad	Radial Rays
	CPL	Kwon, JS	Kyung Buk Natl	1	French Literature

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>College/Univ</u>	<u># Yrs</u>	<u>Major</u>
CSC	SGT	Jang, KH	Tax Bus Jr	Grad	Tariffics
	SGT	Kim, SR	Chung Ju	2	Mathematics
	SGT	Moon, IS	Mik Won	1	Mik Won
	SGT	Park, JH	Dong Shin Jr	Grad	Tax Account
	SGT	Lee, SH	Chung Ju	2	Local Dev Science
	SGT	Kim, YJ	Dong Ah	2	Indust Engr
	SGT	Kim, SP	Dae Gu	2	Dietetics
	SGT	Lee, WH	Yung Nam Tech	1	Chem Engr
	SGT	Han, MS	Choong Nam Natl	2	Pol Science
	SGT	Ji, WK	Choong Nam Natl	Grad	Psychology
	SGT	Kim, JH	Kyung Hee	3	Eng Literature
	SGT	Kim, DE	Chung Ju	2	Cptr Engr
	CPL	Lee, SJ	Kye Myung	1	Indust Engr
	CPL	Suk, JH	Dong Ah	2	Bus Admin
	CPL	Lee, JD	So Kang	2	Chem Engr
	CPL	Lee, CK	Sung Kyoon Kwan	1	Genetic Engr
	CPL	Ryoo, YT	Sung Kyoon Kwan	2	Economics
	CPL	Yoo, WJ	Wool San Tech	1	Architecture
	PFC	Jung, OL	Korea Theol	2	Korean Literature
	PFC	No, YS	Han Kuk For Lang	1	Economics
	PVT	Jung, WH	Kyung Hee	1	Pol Diplomat

¹Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry, Battalion
Memorandum subj KATUSA Academic Qualifications, 8 January 1990.

APPENDIX B

KATUSA Academic Qualifications 2/503 Infantry, 2d Infantry Division Republic of Korea As Of: 18 August 1989¹

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>College/Univ</u>	<u># Yrs</u>	<u>Major</u>
HHC	SGT	Ko, SJ	Seoul City	2	Bus Admin
	SGT	Kim, CJ	Korea	2	Elect Engr
	SGT	Shin, JH	Dong Ah	3	Bus Admin
	CPL	Boo, EY	Che Ju Natl	3	Info Engr
	CPL	Choi, WK	Shin Gu Jr	1	Land Register
	CPL	Kim, JW	Korea	2	Bus Admin
	CPL	Lee, CR	Seoul Theol	3	Sociology
	CPL	Jo, YH	So Kang Grad	1	Korean Literature
	CPL	Ji, YI	Yeo Su Fishers	Grad	Aqua Culture
	PFC	No, IH	Chon Buk Natl	3	German Literature
	PFC	Song, TH	Han Yang	1	Mech Engr
	PVT	Lim, KJ	Yung Nam	2	Physics
	PVT	Kim, SK	Kun San	2	Intl Trade

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>College/Univ</u>	<u># Yrs</u>	<u>Major</u>
A Co	SGT	Kang, YH	Jeon Ju	1	Law
	SGT	Yoo, YH	Kyung Hee	1	Economics
	SGT	Jo, KH	Seoul Natl	2	Spanish Literature
	SGT	Park, KS	Yung Nam	2	Mech Engr
	CPL	Jung, TD	Kum Ho Inst Tech	2	Electronics
	CPL	Jin, JH	Kyung Sang Natl	1	Civil Engr
	CPL	Jung, JS	Korea	3	Metal Engr
	CPL	Lee, HJ	Seoul Natl	2	Agric Economics
	CPL	Ryoo, HM	Dong Kuk	2	Korean History
	PFC	Han, DY	Yu Han Tech	1	Electricity
	PFC	Kim, NS	Dae Lim Tech	Grad	Mech Design
	PFC	Kim, JM	Han Yang	2	Comptr Science
	PFC	Kim, CH	Mil Yang Jr	Grad	Landscape Arch

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>College/Univ</u>	<u># Yrs</u>	<u>Major</u>
B Co	SGT	Nam, SK	Dong Ah	2	Intl Trade
	SGT	Kim, MH	Seoul Natl	3	Metal Engr
	SGT	Ahn, SB	Seoul City	1	Bus Admin
	SGT	Kim, JB	Won Kwang	2	Pol Science
	CPL	Kang, JS	Sung Kyoan Kwan	3	Economics
	CPL	No, WS	Dong Kuk	1	Pol Science
	CPL	Lee, CK	Korea	3	Economics
	PFC	Lee, SB	A Ju	1	Economics
	PFC	Kwak, MM	Won Kwang	3	Management
	PFC	Joo, SD	Joong Ahng	1	English Literature
	PVT	Kwon, HK	Yon Sei	1	Mech Engr

APPENDIX B (Continued)

KATUSA Academic Qualifications 2/503 Infantry, 2d Infantry Division Republic of Korea As Of: 18 August 1989

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>College/Univ</u>	<u># Yrs</u>	<u>Major</u>
C Co	SGT	Yum, KS	Sung Kyoong Kwan	3	Indust Engr
	SGT	Lim, JW	Kyung Buk Natl	2	Hyper Chem Engr
	SGT	Suh, BS	So Kang	1	English Literature
	CPL	Jang, YH	Han Yang Tech	Grad	Cmptr Engr
	CPL	Park, JJ	Tan Kuk	3	French Literature
	CPL	Lee, KC	Won Kwang	1	Physics
	CPL	Hyun, WK	Yon Sei	1	Economics
	CPL	Jung, DM	Kun San	2	Chem Engr
	CPL	Kim, DH	So Kang	1	Management
	CPL	Park, SY	Yon Sei	4	Mech Engr
	PFC	Lee, JW	Yon Sei	2	Administration
	PFC	Kim, SK	Dong Nam Jr	Grad	Radial Rays
	PFC	Kwon, JS	Kyung Buk Natl	1	French Literature

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>College/Univ</u>	<u># Yrs</u>	<u>Major</u>
CSC	SGT	Ahn, SH	Joong Ahng	1	Bus Admin
	SGT	Shin, DJ	Seoul Natl	3	Linguistics
	SGT	Jang, KH	Tax Bus Jr	Grad	Tariffics
	SGT	Lee, SK	Kyung Won	4	Pol Science
	SGT	Kim, SR	Chung Ju	2	Math Education
	SGT	Moon, IS	Mok Won	1	Musical Art Educ
	SGT	Park, JH	Dong Shin Jr	Grad	Tax Account
	SGT	Lee, SH	Chung Ju	2	Local Dev Science
	CPL	Kim, YJ	Dong Ah	2	Indust Engr
	CPL	Kim, SP	Dae Gu	2	Dietetics
	CPL	Lee, WH	Yung Nam Tech	1	Chem Engr
	CPL	Han, MS	Choong Nam Natl	2	Pol Science
	CPL	Ji, WK	Choong Nam Natl	Grad	Psychology
	CPL	Kim, JH	Kyung Hee	3	English Literature
	CPL	Kim, DE	Chung Ju	2	Cmptr Engr
	CPL	Lee, SJ	Kye Myung	1	Indust Engr
	CPL	Suk, JH	Dong Ah	2	Bus Admin
	PFC	Lee, JD	So Kang	2	Chem Engr
	PFC	Lee, CK	Sung Kyoong Kwan	1	Genetic Engr
	PFC	Ryoo, YT	Sung Kyoong Kwan	2	Economics
	PFC	Yoo, WJ	Wool San Tech	1	Architecture
	PVT	Jung, OR	Korea Theolog	2	Korean Literature

¹Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry, Battalion
 Memorandum subj KATUSA Status of College Education, 18 August
 1989.

APPENDIX C

KATUSA Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) 2/503 Infantry, 2d Infantry Division Republic of Korea 1988-90¹

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Section</u>	<u>Job Title</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>#Spaces</u>
HHC	Bn KATUSA PAC	Admin Supv	71L	E9	1
		Intpr/Transltr	71L	E5	1
		Gen Clerk	71L	E5	1
		Gen Clerk	71L	E4	1
	Co Hqs	Sr KATUSA	71L	E5	1
		Sup Spec	76Y	E4	1
		NBC Clerk	54B	E3	1
	S-1 (Pers)	Gen Clerk	71L	E5	1
		Pubs Clerk	71L	E4	1
		File Clerk	71L	E4	1
	Med	Med Spec	91A	E4	1
	S-2 (Intel)	Gen Clerk	71L	E4	1
	S-3 (Opns/Tng)	Draftsman	81B	E4	1
	S-4 (Supply)	Gen Clerk	71L	E5	1
	Mtr Pool	PLL Clerk	76C	E3	2
	<u>Total</u>				<u>16</u>

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Section</u>	<u>Job Title</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>#Spaces</u>
A/B/C	Co Hqs	Sr KATUSA	71L	E5	1
Cos		Sup Spec	76Y	E4	1
		NBC Clerk	54B	E3	1
	Rifle Plts	Rifleman	11B	E5	2
		Rifleman	11B	E4	2
		Rifleman	11B	E3	5
	Wpns Plt	Ammo Hdlr	11C	E4	1
		Mortarman	11C	E4	1
		Mortarman	11C	E3	1
	<u>Total</u>				<u>15 @ Co</u>

APPENDIX C (Continued)

KATUSA Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA)
2/503 Infantry, 2d Infantry Division
Republic of Korea
1988-90

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Section</u>	<u>Job Title</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>#Spaces</u>
CSC	Co Hqs	Sr KATUSA	71L	E5	1
		Sup Spec	76Y	E4	1
		NBC Clerk	54B	E3	1
	AT Plts	Crewman	11H	E5	6
		Crewman	11H	E4	6
		Crewman	11H	E3	1
	Mort Plt	Mortarman	11C	E5	1
		Mortarman	11C	E4	1
		Mortarman	11C	E3	1
		Ammo Hdlr	11C	E4	1
	Sct Plt	Observer	11B	E5	1
		Observer	11B	E4	1
		Observer	11B	E3	1
	<u>Total</u>				<u>28</u>

Bn Total	89
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¹Headquarters, ROKA Support Group, KATUSA Table of
Distribution and Allowances (TDA) (Eighth Army Personnel Command
[EAPC], APO San Francisco 96301-0009: undated).

APPENDIX D

KATUSAs in Critical Combat Systems 2/503 Infantry, 2d Infantry Division Republic of Korea 1988-90¹

Unit	Section	# Auth Enl Pers	----- # -----
Bn	KATUSA PAC	KATUSA	US
	Co Sr KATUSA	4	0
		5	0
HHC	Co Hqs	2	5
	Bn Staff	6	76
	Med	1	30
	Mtr Pool	2	14
A/B/C	Co Hqs	2/Co	9/Co
Cos	3 Rifle Plts	9/Co	111/Co
	Wpns Plt	3/Co	19/Co
CSC	Co Hqs	2	10
	3 Anti-Tk Plts	18	63
	Mortar Plt	4	25
	Scout Plt	3	26
		=====	=====
Bn Total		89	666

----- # -----
Critical Cbt Systems

9 Rifle Sqds/Co
3 @ 81mm ILO 60mm/Co

18 TOWs
4 @ 4.2 ILO 181mm
5 Scout Squads

Notes: 1/ HHC is Headquarters and Headquarters Company.
2/ A/B/C Cos are the 3 infantry line companies: Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie.
3/ CSC is the Combat Support Company.
4/ KATUSA PAC is the Personnel Admin Center.
5/ In lieu of (ILO).

¹Headquarters, ROKA Support Group, KATUSA Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) (Eighth Army Personnel Command [EAPC], APO San Francisco 96301-0009: undated). Also, Headquarters, Eighth United States Army, Transmittal of Approved Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) No. 07015HP801, Infantry Battalion, E/W TOW (with 3 changes) (APO San Francisco 96301-0009: 15 December 1987).

APPENDIX E

Glossary of Terms for the Origination of the Philippine Scouts 1899¹

BANCA (bahn'-cah), Spanish; a small boat made out of a hollow tree and with a top or roof of bamboo.

BARRIO (bah'-rryoh), Spanish; a political division of a pueblo, which is composed of a head town and several barrios (wards) or hamlets. The barrios or wards are either town or country, urban or suburban.

BOLO (boh'-loh), Spanish; a wood knife.

CASCO (cahs'-koh), Native; a large boat with 1 or 2 masts and matting or hemp sails slightly narrower at the top than at the bottom, for carrying freight. It is almost square, somewhat resembling a scow, flat and very serviceable, especially on the Pasig River between Manila and Laguna de Bay, and also to and from ships to the wharf.

CIMARRON (see-mah-rrohn'), Native; a native living in a state of wild freedom; a name given to wild beasts.

INDIOS (een'-dyohs), Spanish; the natives are generally known by this name, but particularly those subject to the Spanish Government in contradiction to the Cimarrones.

PUEBLO (pway'-bloh), Spanish; a town or district, corresponding rather to a township or county than to a town, often embracing a large area and many hamlets. The pueblo is a name for the community, or town, which is composed of the surrounding barrios or districts within defined or accepted limits being appurtenant thereto for local administration or other purposes.

¹The Bureau of Insular Affairs, US War Department, A Pronouncing Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, United States of America (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902), xxxi to xxxvii. This glossary was prepared for and included in an unpublished thesis: Major Allan D. Marple, "The Philippine Scouts: A Case Study in the Use of Indigenous Soldiers, Northern Luzon, The Philippine Islands, 1899," Diss. US Army Command and General Staff College 1983, xii.

APPENDIX F

Chronology of Significant Events in Northern Luzon, The Philippine Islands, 1899¹

4 February	The Philippine Insurrection begins when fighting breaks out in Manila.
26 July	Lieutenant Batson recommended for the Medal of Honor.
late August	General Otis allows Batson to recruit 100 Macabebes.
mid-September	Macabebes prove themselves in battle near Arayat.
20 September	General Young assumes command, 3d Brigade, 1st Division.
14 October	Batson's and Lowe's Scouts report to Young.
17 October	Native scouts prove themselves to Young in battle near Cabiao.
20 October	Batson ordered by Young to recruit a full battalion of Macabebes.
3 November	Macabebes ambushed near Aliaga. Batson recommended for a second Medal of Honor.
7 November	Young kicks off the attack through the mountains which eventually encircles the insurgent army.
8 November	Macabebes capture insurgent orders outlining the Filipino retreat into the Cagayan Valley.
12 November	Young and the Macabebes cross the Agno River in hot pursuit of Aguinaldo, the insurgent leader.
16 November	Aguinaldo narrowly escapes the Macabebes at Pozorubbio.
19 November	Batson is wounded during the attack on Aringay.
23 November	Castner's Scouts begin Bachelor's March into the Cagayan Valley.
6 December	Macabebes ordered back to Manila for rest and recuperation.

Chronology of Significant Events
in
Northern Luzon, The Philippine Islands,
1899

¹Prepared from an unpublished thesis: Major Allan D. Marple, "The Philippine Scouts: A Case Study in the Use of Indigenous Soldiers, Northern Luzon, The Philippine Islands, 1899," Diss. US Army Command and General Staff College 1983, xiii.

APPENDIX G .

Field Orders, Number 7,
First Division, Eighth Army Corps,
Cabanatuan, Philippine Islands,
6 November 1899¹

I. This command will prepare immediately for a move to the front. All surplus weight and articles must be discarded from man, animal, and wheel transportation. Cooking stoves, buzzacott ovens, and all kitchen furniture, except boilers or camp kettles for cooking coffee, must be stored here or abandoned. Four carts will be allowed to each troop, battery, or company; one cart to a hospital of an independent battalion or less; two carts to each regimental headquarters; two carts to each squadron or battalion, being one for headquarters and one for medical department. One hundred and twenty rounds of ammunition to be carried by each trooper; 100 rounds by each foot soldier (more desired). One hundred rounds per man to be carried on company transportation. One noncommissioned officer to have charge of company transportation of each battalion or squadron.

The loading of all carts will be supervised by an experienced officer, who will not permit the weight loaded on any one cart with two bulls to exceed 1,000 pounds, and for single bulls 600 pounds.

A supply train will follow. The following remarks by the major-general commanding the division, already published to this command, are republished and will be read to every organization: "The great problem to be solved on this expedition and on the solution of which the entire success or absolute failure of it depends is the transportation of our supplies. We have a long

APPENDIX G (Continued)

Field Orders, Number 7,
First Division, Eighth Army Corps,
Cabanatuan, Philippine Islands,
6 November 1899

and difficult line to bring them over and a most insufficient means to work with. The major-general commanding the division therefore appeals both to the personal pride of every officer and man of this command and to his patriotism, to work at all hours and at all places, to advance our supplies and aid the transportation. To confine his necessities to the lowest possible limit and to husband all supplies to the utmost should be considered by everyone as his own particular duty."

The brigadier-general commanding the brigade joins his appeal with that of the major-general commanding the division to the personal pride, fidelity, and patriotism of every officer and enlisted man of this command he feels as certain of success as of the hard work to be performed and the hardships to be endured. We can accomplish any success within the possibility of trained soldiers.

II. Order of march for to-morrow:

First. Battalion of Macabebes, Lieutenant Batson commanding.

Second. Troop F, Third Cavalry, Captain Dodd commanding.

Third. Battalion Twenty-second Infantry, Captain Ballance commanding.

Fourth. Battalion Thirty-seventh Infantry (mountain battery), Captain Koehler commanding.

Fifth. Second squadron and one-half of third squadron, Third Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Wessells commanding.

The first and second organizations named being already across the river, will proceed in the order named, in accordance

APPENDIX G (Continued)

Field Orders, Number 7,
First Division, Eighth Army Corps,
Cabanatuan, Philippine Islands,
6 November 1899

with previous instructions, to Talaver. The march of the other organizations will be governed in their progress by the time consumed in crossing the river.

The third organization will be prepared to cross immediately on completion of the rope ferry. Each succeeding organization will be prepared to move from its cantonment in time to follow without delay the preceding organization. Each organization will furnish its own train guard. The Third Cavalry will furnish a strong guard for the entire train. Trains will move in order of the organization to which they belong.

By command of Brigadier-General Young:

W. R. Smedberg, Jr.
First Lieutenant, Fourth Cavalry, A.D.C., A.A.G.

¹US War Department, Annual Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1900 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900), Part 4, 273. This document was included in an unpublished thesis: Major Allan D. Marple, "The Philippine Scouts: A Case Study in the Use of Indigenous Soldiers, Northern Luzon, The Philippine Islands, 1899," Diss. US Army Command and General Staff College 1983, 137-138.

APPENDIX H

Act of Congress
for the Creation of Scouts,
Approved:
2 February 1901¹

Section 36. Act of Congress approved February 2, 1901.

That when in his opinion the conditions in the Philippine Islands justify such action the President is authorized to enlist natives of those islands for service in the Army, to be organized as scouts, with such officers as he shall deem necessary for their proper control, or as troops or as companies, as authorized by this act, for the Regular Army, in squadrons or battalions, with officers and noncommissioned officers corresponding to similar organizations in the cavalry and infantry arms. The total number of enlisted men in said organizations shall not exceed twelve thousand, and the total enlisted force of the line of the Army, together with such native force, shall not exceed at any one time one hundred thousand.

The majors to command the squadrons and battalions shall be selected by the President from captains of the line of the Regular Army, and while so serving shall have the rank, pay and allowances of the grade of major. The captains of the troops or companies shall be selected by the President from first lieutenants of the line of the Regular Army, and while so serving they shall have the rank, pay, and allowances of captain of the arm to which assigned. The squadron and battalion staff officers, the first and second lieutenants for companies, may be selected from noncommissioned officers or enlisted men of the Regular Army of not less than two years' service, or from

APPENDIX H (Continued)

Act of Congress
for the Creation of Scouts,
Approved:
2 February 1901


officers or noncommissioned or enlisted men serving, or who have served, in the volunteers subsequent to April twenty-first, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and officers of those grades shall be given provisional appointments for periods of four years each, and no such appointments shall be continued for the second or subsequent term unless the officer's conduct shall have been satisfactory in every respect. The pay and allowances of provisional officers of native organizations shall be those authorized for officers of like grades in the Regular Army. The pay, rations, and clothing allowances to be authorized for the enlisted men shall be fixed by the Secretary of War, and shall not exceed those authorized for the Regular Army.

When in the opinion of the President, natives of the Philippine Islands shall, by virtue of their services and character, show fitness for command, the President is authorized to make provisional appointments to the grades of second and first lieutenants from such natives, who, when so appointed, shall have the pay and allowances to be fixed by the Secretary of War, not exceeding those of corresponding grades of the Regular Army.

¹Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1904, Report of the Philippine Commission (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1905), XIII, 17-18. This document was included in an unpublished thesis: Major Allan D. Marple, "The Philippine Scouts: A Case Study in the Use of Indigenous Scouts, Northern Luzon, The Philippine Islands, 1899," Diss. US Army Command & General Staff College 1983, 139-140.

APPENDIX I

Philippine Islands, 1899 ¹



¹Map copied from Russell Roth, Muddy Glory (W. Hanover, Massachusetts: The Christopher Publishing House, 1981), frontispiece.

Notes

¹Office of the President of the United States, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: August 1991, 27.

²Eric Schmitt, in "A New Battle is Ahead for Powell: The Budget" The New York Times, 17 January 1992, Col 3, A16.

³Headquarters, Eighth United States Army, EUSA Regulation 600-2: Republic of Korea Army Personnel with the United States Army (Eighth Army Personnel Command [EAPC], APO San Francisco 96301-0009: 19 October 1988), 1-1.

⁴Gary A. Olsen, Major, US Army, "The Kit Carson Scout Program," (US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1972), 1-21.

⁵John M. Gates, in Schoolbooks and Kraggs (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973), 8-12 and 18 and 23.

⁶R. Ernest Dupuy, Colonel, US Army-Retired, in The Compact History of the United States Army, 4th ed. (New York: Hawthorn books, 1956), 149 and 154.

⁷Ibid., 149.

⁸George B. Grinnell, in The Great Scouts and Their Pawnee Battalion (Cleveland, Ohio: Arthur H. Clark, 1928), 65-67 and 69 and 71 and 73 and 79.

⁹Dan L. Thrapp, in Al Sieber, Chief of Scouts (Norman Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma, 1964), 89.

¹⁰Charles R. Howland, Colonel, US Army, in "The Philippine Insurrection of 1899," Infantry Journal, 30 (April 1927), 396.

¹¹Ibid., 402-404.

¹²W. L. Sibert, Captain, US Army Corps of Engineers, in "Military Occupation of Northern Luzon," Journal of The Military Service Institution of the United States, 30 (January - June 1902), 404-408.

¹³Howland, op. cit., 406.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵"Lawton, Henry Ware," The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, (New York: James T. White & Co., 1906), X, 290; and, "MacArthur, Arthur," Ibid., 151-152.

¹⁶US War Department, Annual Report of the Major-General Commanding the Army, 1899 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1899), Part 3, 201. Taken from the Report of Major General H. W. Lawton, U.S.V., of an expedition to the Provinces of Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, and Pampanga, Luzon, April 22 to May 30, 1899 (San Isidro or Northern Expedition), and accompanying reports of subordinate commanders. Hereafter, basic document is referred to as War Report, 1899, Part 3.

¹⁷US Department of the Army, Public Information Division, The Medal of Honor of the United States Army (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), 242-246. Hereafter, referred to The Medal Honor.

¹⁸Lawton, War Report, 1899, Part 3, op. cit., 230-231 and 238-239 and 248.

¹⁹Howland, op. cit., 397. Also, James Parker, Lieutenant Colonel, 45th Infantry, U.S.V., "Some Random Notes on the Fighting in the Philippines," Journal of The Military Service Institution of the United States, 27 (July-December 1900), 317-319.

²⁰US War Department, Annual Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1900 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900), Part 2, 209. Taken from the Report of Major General E.S. Otis, U.S.A., commanding the Division of the Philippines and military governor of the Philippine Islands, September 1, 1899, to May 5, 1900. Hereafter, basic document is referred to as War Report, FY 1900, Part 2. Also, Ben H. Chastine, Captain, 57th Infantry (Philippine Scouts), "Macabebes," Journal of the US Infantry Association, 36 (January - June 1930), 626-629.

²¹The Medal of Honor, op. cit., 244.

²²Otis, War Report, FY 1900, Part 2, op. cit., 209.

²³US War Department, Annual Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1900 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900), Part 4, 278. Taken from the Report of Major General H.W. Lawton, U.S.V., of an expedition to the provinces north of Manila, Philippine Islands, during the months of September through December, 1899. Hereafter, basic document is referred to as War Report, FY 1900, Part 4.

²⁴T. H. Slavens, Brigadier General, US Army-Retired, Scouting in Northern Luzon, Philippine Islands, 1899-1900 (Publisher unknown, 1947), 3-21.

²⁵See Appendix G.

²⁶Lawton, War Report, FY 1900, Part 4, op. cit., 278.

²⁷See Appendix H.

²⁸Lawton, War Report, FY 1900, Part 4, op. cit., 373-379.

²⁹J. N. Munro, Major, Philippine Scouts, "The Native Scout Organization," Journal of US Cavalry Association, 20 (July 1909 to May 1910), 290.

³⁰J. N. Munro, Captain, 3d Cavalry, "The Philippine Native Scouts," Journal of the US Infantry Association, 2 (1 July 1905), 178.

³¹John W. Ward, Lieutenant, US Army, "The Use of Native Troops in Our New Possessions," Journal of The Military Service Institution of the United States, 31 (July - December 1902), 802.

³²Ibid., 797.

³³Headquarters, Eighth United States Army, EUSA Regulation 600-2: Republic of Korea Army Personnel with the United States Army (Eighth Army Personnel Command [EAPC], APO San Francisco 96301-0009: 19 October 1988), 1-1 (hereafter referred to as EUSA Regulation 600-2).

³⁴Taken from "US-KATUSA Soldiers" USFK KORUS, 16 August 1989, Vol. 17, No. 15, 14.

³⁵EUSA Regulation 600-2, 1-1.

³⁶Ibid., 1-3.

³⁷Ibid., 1-5.

³⁸Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry, Inactivation Ceremonies (Camp Hovey, Republic of Korea: Summer 1990), 2.

³⁹Headquarters, ROKA Support Group, KATUSA Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) (Eighth Army Personnel Command [EAPC], APO San Francisco 96301-0009: undated). The Commander, EAPC is the agent in Eighth US Army who implements the program in US units. (hereafter referred to as KATUSA TDA).

⁴⁰Headquarters, Eighth United States Army, Transmittal of Approved Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) No. 07015HP801, Infantry Battalion, E/W TOW (with 3 changes) (APO San Francisco 96301-0009: 15 December 1987). Two other infantry battalions were similarly organized in the 2d Infantry Division: 1/506 Infantry and 1/503 Infantry. (hereafter referred to as US MTOE).

⁴¹Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Personnel, The Army Enlisted Personnel Management Plan (FY 1987-91) (Washington, D.C.: 15 October 1985), II-7 (hereafter referred to as 1985 EPMP). Also, Department of Defense, Manpower Requirements Report, FY 1989 (Washington, D.C.: March 1988), III-4.

⁴²Lieutenant General Frederic J. Brown, US Army, Retired, in "AirLand Battle Future: The Other Side of the Coin" Military Review, February 1991, 23. General Brown has opined that "AOE 'shaved the excess' from the Army in order to squeeze two more divisions from a constant total personnel strength...Statistical health notwithstanding, there is pernicious anemia in the current force...there are significant bills yet to be paid."

⁴³Major W. E. DePuy, US Army, later General, US Army, Retired, in "11 Men, 1 Mind" Army Magazine, March 1958, n. pag.

⁴⁴Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 7-8: The Infantry Platoon and Squad (Infantry, Airborne, Air Assault, Ranger) (Washington, D.C.: 31 December 1980), 1-15.

⁴⁵EUSA Regulation 600-2, 1-4.

⁴⁶Headquarters, 2d Infantry Division, Demilitarized Zone Battalion Standing Operating Procedures (Camp Casey, Republic of Korea: 30 January 1989), D-3.

⁴⁷Headquarters, US Army Infantry Center, USAIC Pamphlet No. 350-6, Training: The Expert Infantryman Badge (EIB) Test (Fort Benning, Georgia 31905-5000: 3 April 1989), 1-1.

⁴⁸Headquarters, ROKA Support Group, KATUSA Handbook (Eighth Army Personnel Command [EAPC], APO San Francisco 96301-0009: 1 November 1986), Cdr, ROKA Support Group, 1 Nov 1986, 8-12. This handbook is bilingual.

⁴⁹Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 7-20: The Infantry Battalion (Infantry, Airborne, Air Assault) (Washington, D.C.: 28 December 1984), 3-2 and 3-3.

⁵⁰On the particular day that all KATUSA soldiers were restricted in the 2d Infantry Division, I was briefing the division commanding general during a Quarterly Training Briefing. He was astounded when this information was revealed. Some days later, a backdated message was delivered through US channels which belatedly authorized this action.

⁵¹Unable to determine the source of this recent statistic.

⁵²"Asia's Emerging Economies" The Economist, 16 November 1991, 4.

⁵³EUSA Regulation 600-2, 5-4.

⁵⁴Ibid., 2-1.

⁵⁵EUSA Regulation 600-2, 7-1, 7-3, 7-4, 7-6.

⁵⁶Major General Jack D. Woodall, Commander, 2d Infantry Division pushed the Equal Opportunity Program and tied it, by policy memorandum, to a separate KATUSA Relations policy. His thesis was to insure that equal opportunity and treatment were provided to both US and KATUSA soldiers. Reference: EAIDCG Policy Statement Memorandums 5-89 and 7-89, Equal Opportunity and KATUSA Relations respectively, both dated 5 October 1989.

⁵⁷Dennis M. Drew, Colonel, USAF, Airpower Research Institute, in Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: American Military Dilemmas and Doctrinal Proposals (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, March 1988), 35.

⁵⁸Fred Hiatt, in "The Nightmare of Serving in the South Korean Army." National Weekly Edition, The Washington Post, Spring 1989, page unknown (clipping removed date and page number.

⁵⁹Map was traced and adapted from Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother (London: Longman's, Green and Co., LTD, 1960), frontispiece.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Information summarized from: "Lawton, Henry Ware," The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, (New York: James T. White & Co., 1906), X, 290; "Young, Samuel Baldwin Marks," Ibid., XIII, 313; "Funston, Frederick," Ibid., XI, 40-41. For data on Batson, Major Allan D. Marple, "The Philippine Scouts: A Case Study in the Use of Indigenous Scouts, Northern Luzon, The Philippine Islands, 1899," Diss. US Army Command and General Staff College 1983, 68-85. A superb study of the entire subject may be found in James Richard Woolard, "The Philippine Scouts: The Development of America's Colonial Army" Diss. The Ohio State University 1975.

⁶²US MTOE and KATUSA TDA.

⁶³US MTOE and KATUSA TDA.

⁶⁴US MTOE and several old FMs and TC to avoid AOE doctrinal bias, eg FM 23-92 dtd 10 June 1970; TC 23-23 dtd 9 July 1970; FM 23-90 dtd 25 February 1972; and, FM 7-10 dtd 17 April 1970 (See Bibliography).

⁶⁵Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry, Battalion Memorandum subj KATUSA Status of College Education, 18 August 1989.

⁶⁶Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry, numerous memorandum showing status of KATUSA training.

⁶⁷Ibid., for KATUSA pay and 1991 US Military Pay Tables of US enlisted personnel as described in notes at Table 6.

⁶⁸EUSA Regulation 600-2 for KATUSA and 1985 EPMP for US enlisted personnel.

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